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Abstract 
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of two instruction sets, one which 
encouraged them to rely on their intuitions and another which encouraged a more analytical 
thinking style. Participants were also randomly assigned to read one of two reports in order to 
decide whether an elementary school student who exhibited some ambiguously aggressive 
behaviors should be recommended for a program designed for children with behavioral 
problems. The otherwise identical reports were either concerning a student named “Eric” or a 
student named “Tyrone.” I predicted that participants would be more likely overall to 
recommend Tyrone for the behavioral program than Eric, but that this effect will be more 
pronounced for participants in the condition that encouraged an intuitive thinking style. This 
hypothesis was not confirmed. Participants in the condition that encouraged an intuitive thinking 
style were more confident in their judgments and less ambivalent about their judgments than 
participants who were encouraged to use an analytical thinking style.  
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Many people firmly believe that they would never base an important decision, such as 
whether to give a person a job or determine that person’s guilt or innocence in a court of law, on 
a stereotype. In fact, people who report low levels of prejudice believe they are unaffected by 
stereotypes when it comes to their treatment of others, simply because they do not consciously 
endorse these stereotypes as valid (Devine, 1989; Plant & Devine, 1998). However, research has 
shown time and again that stereotypes often impact our judgment in numerous ways, whether or 
not we give credence to these potentially prejudicial beliefs (Devine, 1989; Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Most problematically, social 
psychologists have further demonstrated that we are not always capable of correcting for 
potential biases in our judgments of others, even at times when we are motivated to do so 
(Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Plant & Devine, 2009). In fact, 
sometimes attempts to correct for biases backfire and lead people to become biased in a direction 
opposite from their stereotypes (e.g., Petty, Wegener, & White, 1995). 
Stereotypes are defined as mental representations that associate individuals with specific 
characteristics based on their membership to a particular group (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Hilton 
& von Hippel, 1996). Although people often report knowing about specific stereotypes of 
various groups while disavowing these stereotypes’ validity (Devine, 1989), many researchers 
have suggested thinking about stereotypes as a kind of heuristic that people automatically or 
implicitly use to interpret the behaviors of others more efficiently and with less cognitive effort 
(Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Bodenhausen, 1990; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). More recently, 
however, Wegener, Clark, and colleagues (Wegener, Clark & Petty, 2006; Clark, Wegener, 
Brinol, & Petty, 2009) have shown evidence that stereotypes are not only used as judgmental  
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shortcuts, but that they can also bias judgment-relevant thinking and validate stereotype-
consistent thoughts when the stereotypes are considered in a more deliberative manner.  
Researchers have found repeatedly that stereotypes are frequently used when processing 
information and forming judgments, whether the stereotypic information is used in a relatively 
thoughtful or non-thoughtful manner. Consequently, negative stereotypes even influence the 
thinking and behavior of those who are targeted by them and experience negative consequences 
due to their application. A seminal study in early social psychology illustrated that young black 
girls were more likely to play with a white doll than a black doll when given a choice between 
the two because the white doll was more appealing to them (Clark & Clark, 1947). Relatedly, 
another study found that women rated scholarly articles more favorably when identical articles 
were attributed to male rather than female authors (Goldberg, 1968). These studies showing that 
stereotypes can be used even when they are opposed to one’s own interests provide suggestive 
evidence that stereotyping can often be involuntary. Researchers have explored how people can 
control for these potentially prejudicial beliefs when making judgments, as there is considerable 
evidence for their widespread influence in social life. 
 
The Continuum of Automatic vs. Controlled Processing 
Research examining stereotype activation and how people subsequently control for 
prejudice often describes “automatic” versus “controlled” processing of information, and how 
the resulting thoughts can have different consequences for the use of stereotypes in judgment 
(Blair & Banaji, 1996; Payne, 2001; Wegener et al., 2006). In the context of decision-making, 
controlled processing refers to relatively more effortful cognitive processes that identify and 
elaborate on the most important aspects of the situation. On the other hand, “automatic 
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processing” refers to relatively more rapid, potentially involuntary processing that generally 
sacrifices accuracy for efficiency when scrutinizing the available information (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). It is easiest to think of automatic versus 
controlled processing as theoretical limits at each end of a continuum that represents an 
individual’s depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), whereby a stereotype can be 
activated and used relatively automatically (e.g. Bodenhausen, 1990) or relatively more 
thoughtfully (e.g. Wegener et al., 2006), depending on many situational and individual factors. 
 In a culture that has grown to disapprove of negative stereotypes of minority groups, 
researchers have previously assumed that many of the prejudicial judgments people make based 
on stereotypes result from the relatively more automatic, involuntary form of information 
processing. Support for this hypothesis is impressive, and can be found in studies showing that 
people recall stereotypic information or make stereotypic judgments more frequently when they 
have neither the motivation nor the time to override the influences of stereotyping on thinking 
(Bodenhausen, 1990; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & 
Knippenberg, 2004). For instance, Macrae et al. (1993) required participants to view a video of a 
woman answering questions about herself, and manipulated whether the woman used relatively 
stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent language to describe herself. Participants who 
were placed under high cognitive load by being instructed to remember an 8-digit number while 
viewing the video were more likely to recall stereotype-consistent information about the woman 
in the video than the participants who did not have as cognitively demanding a task to perform, 
and thus were also more likely to make judgments of the woman reflecting these stereotypes. In 
another study by Wigdolbus et al. (2004), participants read particular behaviors of a person and 
then identified whether a subsequently given trait accurately matched the aforementioned 
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behavior. Participants formed their evaluations of a person with either a common Asian name or 
a common Caucasian-American name, and half of the participants were placed under relatively 
higher cognitive load. Participants under higher cognitive load had a significantly longer reaction 
time when tasked with correctly rejecting a stereotype-consistent trait of a person with an Asian 
name than participants in the low cognitive load condition. These studies support the idea that 
stereotypes can frequently be used as judgmental heuristics, especially when motivation and 
ability to process information are relatively low.  
Other research on stereotyping has shown that even in the absence of distraction, time 
constraints or cognitive load, people often rely on stereotypes to aid in judgments about 
ambiguous situations. Duncan (1976) conducted a seminal study showing that white participants 
were more likely to rate an ambiguous shove as aggressive when the person executing the shove 
was black rather than white. A follow-up study showed that students evaluated ambiguously 
aggressive behaviors, such as poking a classmate with a pen, as more violent when the actor was 
black rather than when the actor was white, regardless of the participating student’s own race 
(Sagar & Schofield, 1980). The results from these studies indicate that stereotypes were not 
necessarily used as judgmental heuristics, but perhaps as schemas that acted as biases in  
thoughtful processing of the ambiguous information (Wegener et al., 2006). On the whole, 
evidence from these studies supports the idea that people are more susceptible to information 
provided by stereotypes when judgments are complex, ambiguous or require a substantial 
amount of interpretation. 
An Attitudinal Perspective on Stereotyping 
The history of stereotyping research in psychology follows closely the history of 
developing indirect measures of individuals’ “implicit” associations and evaluations of others 
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(for a review, see Fazio & Olson, 2003). Research on sequential priming (the “bona fide 
pipeline;” Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) and the implicit association test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was developed primarily to detect when individuals’ 
more automatic responses in social categorization tasks were stereotype-consistent associations 
that people would otherwise not endorse on more deliberative measures of their evaluations. As a 
rule, these implicit measures require participants to complete the association tasks with such 
speed that controlled processing exerts a minimal influence on evaluative responses. Mapping 
onto the “automatic” versus “controlled” processes of stereotyping, researchers in the attitudes 
domain have repeatedly found that individuals report having relatively positive attitudes towards 
African-Americans on more controllable “explicit” measures, whereas these same individuals 
exhibit relatively greater negativity on less controllable “implicit” measures like the IAT 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Petty, Brinol, & Johnson, 2012).  For example, a person may 
consciously reject negative academic performance stereotypes of African Americans, but this  
person may still exhibit an automatic association of African-Americans with lesser intelligence 
on an implicit measure of their social categorizations.  
 Describing the Meta-Cognitive Model of attitudes (MCM), Petty, Briñol, and DeMarree 
(2007) explained that the phenomenon of discrepant implicit-explicit associations arises from 
object-evaluation links that differ in relative strength along with meta-cognitively applied 
“validity tags” that indicate whether or not a particular evaluative association is valid or true. For 
example, from historically fraught race relations to modern-day media representations, an 
individual may have acquired an impression of African-Americans as being more likely to 
behave violently than Whites. The attitude object (African-Americans) is therefore linked to the 
association or evaluation (aggressive, negative) in memory. However, if this person reflects on 
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his or her thoughts and concludes that he or she does not explicitly endorse this particular 
stereotype, then the evaluation is negated by linking it with a tag in memory, indicating that this 
association is “invalid.”  As long as a person has the cognitive resources available and is 
sufficiently motivated, he or she can access these validity tags to override the stereotypic 
association that would result from relatively less effortful processing. However, if one is not 
motivated to use a controlled thinking process or if one is unable to do so because of time 
constraints or cognitive distractions, one may access the negative stereotype association from 
memory without also retrieving the validity tag that designates this association as invalid. Thus, 
stereotypes might lead someone to make decisions that are diametrically opposed to one’s 
consciously endorsed beliefs and values, depending on the extent to which motivation and ability 
to process individuating information are both relatively high and on how strong the implicit 
association is in memory.  
 
The Present Research 
The proposed study is focused on expanding our understanding of when stereotypes are 
more or less likely to be used in social judgments. This question is explored in two ways: (1) by 
manipulating the relative usefulness or liking for intuitive or “gut feelings” when asking people 
to make potentially stereotype-consistent judgments, and (2) assessing individuals’ trait 
differences and their external versus internal motivations to control for their own prejudice. Each 
of these points is described in detail below 
Influencing the Usefulness of Automatically Activated Stereotypes. There are social 
influences that affect the kind of processing people engage in and whether they are prone to use 
stereotypes. One such variable is social judgeability concerns, which motivate people to process 
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and use information in a way that is consistent with social expectations (Yzerbyt et al., 1994). 
Loersch, McCaslin, & Petty (2010) showed that participants can be influenced to use 
subliminally conditioned associations to a person on explicit self-report measures of attitudes 
when social judgeability concerns were alleviated. Loersch et al. (2010) manipulated the 
“usefulness” of these associations by telling half the participants that it was appropriate to use 
their “gut feelings” to make a decision about the attitude object. Participants who were told to 
“go with their gut” were far more likely to use subliminally presented information when forming 
and expressing their attitudes toward a novel individual. That people often have thoughts or 
experiences about their own thinking processes (i.e., meta-cognitions) means that people can also 
deem some thoughts more valid than others, varying across individuals and situations (Petty et  
al., 2007). Clearly, then, manipulating these meta-cognitive processes should also influence how 
people use stereotypes, form attitudes, and make social judgments.  
Motivations to Respond without Prejudice. Social influences also affect the degree to 
which people use stereotypes in person perception by potentially imbuing people with a 
normative motivation to control for prejudicial responses (Plant & Devine, 1998; 2009). Reliance 
on stereotypes to make reasonable judgments of others often goes against commonly known 
social norms, but the reasons for people to be motivated to respond without prejudice can vary 
across individuals and situations. A relatively high internal motivation to respond without 
prejudice is based in personal beliefs that emphasize the relatively greater importance of values 
like social equality, whereas a relatively high external motivation to respond without prejudice is 
based in heightened fears of social disapproval. People can have both of these differential 
motivational sources or neither of them, and each source of motivation carries its own 
implications for successful control for prejudice. Those motivated to respond without prejudice 
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by external factors are most sensitive to learning ways by which their outwardly “detectable” 
prejudice can be controlled, whereas those motivated to respond without prejudice by internal 
factors are insensitive to whether their prejudice is relatively detectable or not (Plant & Devine, 
2009). Interestingly, the interaction of internal and external motivations uniquely predicts the 
extent to which people exhibit implicitly measured race biases, such that people with relatively 
high internal and low external motivations to respond without prejudice show the least amount of 
racial bias on a race IAT (Devine et al., 2002).  
Other Individual Difference Measures. Several different variables have been proposed 
to predict the usage of stereotypes to make judgments. The effects of individuals’ Need for 
Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) have been researched extensively with regards 
to the formation of attitudes. The NFC is defined as an individual’s inclination towards engaging 
in higher-level processing when evaluating a message or forming an attitude. Participants high in 
NFC tend to focus more on the quality of arguments when evaluating a persuasive message, 
whereas those low in NFC tend to focus more on “peripheral cues,” such as the number of 
arguments and the attractiveness of the source of the persuasive message (Petty, Cacioppo, & 
Morri, 1983). Another individual difference of interest for the current work is participants’ Faith 
in Intuition (FI; Epstein et al. , 1996). FI is a measurement of how likely an individual is to trust 
his or her “gut feelings” about something as being accurate and thus useful for forming attitudes 
and rendering judgments. The FI inventory evaluates whether people prefer to use rational 
system, which is defined as analytic and relatively effortful, when processing information and 
making decisions or an experiential system, which is defined as holistic and comparably 
effortless. Importantly, FI has not been found to be significantly correlated with NFC. Although 
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these researchers have found no significant correlation between FI and modern racism, NFC has 
been shown to be negatively correlated with explicit racist attitudes (Epstein et al, 1996).   
The present research examines the aforementioned variables of racial stereotype 
activation, external or internal motivations to respond without prejudice, and intuitive reasoning 
to examine how these variables taken together may influence the degree to which participants 
will use stereotypes to form attitudes about others and to make stereotype-relevant decisions. In 
the current study, I presented participants with a scenario that asked them to evaluate an 
ambiguously aggressive student, based on a classroom behavior report supposedly drafted by his 
teacher. Between participants, I manipulated whether participants were encouraged or 
discouraged from using their intuitions and “gut feelings” while processing information and 
forming an evaluation, and whether the student was perceived to be African-American or White, 
based on his first name (Eric or Tyrone; Wheeler, Jarvis, & Petty, 2001). I predicted that 
participants who were instructed to rely on (versus reject) their more automatic reactions and 
“gut feelings” about the student would be more likely to use stereotypic  information to form 
stereotype-consistent judgments about a student as being more aggressive when the student was 
perceived to be African-American versus Caucasian-American. Furthermore, I predicted that 
participants who were instructed to rely on their gut feelings would express these stereotype-
consistent attributions of aggression to the student with a higher degree of certainty, and would 
experience less ambivalence about their attitudes and attributions.  I made these predictions 
based on the idea that controlling for prejudice and correcting for biases is a relatively more 
effortful process that involves accessing “validity tags” about particular stereotypical 
associations. Thus, I expected that participants instructed to rely more on their  
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automatic processing of information would be more likely to make stereotype-consistent 
judgments, because these participants would be more influenced by the strength and ease of 
recall of stereotypic associations in memory, and would be less likely to meta-cognitively assess 
the validity of these associations. I also predicted that these effects would be more pronounced 
for participants who reported low internal motivation to respond without prejudice, but high 
external motivation to respond without prejudice. This was because I expected alleviating social 
judgeability concerns with an instruction set encouraging the use of “gut feelings” would 
increase the likelihood that these participants they would make stereotypic judgments to a larger 
to degree than participants with high internal motivation and low external motivation to respond 
without prejudice. Furthermore, I predicted that manipulations of the perceived race of the 
student and thinking style instruction set may temporarily influence participants’ external, but 
not internal, motivations to respond without prejudice, as measured at the very end of the study, 
as the experimental methods may cause people to be relatively more concerned with detectable 
forms of prejudice during the course of the study. Finally, I predicted that NFC and FI may 
moderate the degree to which the race manipulation and the thinking style manipulation 
influenced participants’ use of stereotypes, although I did not make a prediction about the 
directionality of these potential moderators.  
 
Method 
 Participants. 183 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course 
at the Ohio State University participated in this study for course credit. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a 2 [instruction set: rely on gut feelings, reject gut feelings] by 2 [student 
race: African-American or White] between-participants factorial.   
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 Procedure. Participants were presented with experimental instructions on laboratory 
computers using MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2010). Participants were told that the current study 
was being conducted in collaboration with the Department of Education at their university to 
examine how teachers and school administrators evaluated their students based on their 
observations of the students in a classroom setting. The instructions indicated that the participant 
would be learning some information about an actual student through a de-identified behavioral 
profile and, after reading this profile, the participant would make a series of judgments regarding 
his or her general impressions of the student, and whether the student should be enrolled in a 
demanding in-school program designed to reduce behavioral problems of students. 
 Gut feelings manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to either rely on or 
reject their intuitions and gut reactions while learning about the student and forming an 
impression of him. All participants were told that they would be asked to determine whether or 
not an elementary school student should be recommended for placement in a program designed 
to assist students with behavioral problems. Participants who were assigned to rely on their 
intuitions and gut feelings received the following instructions:  
“Past research has demonstrated that these types of judgments are most 
objectively accurate when the evaluator trusts his or her "hunches" or initial 
feelings. This is because those who ignore their gut feelings begin to focus on 
irrelevant details and start to downplay the importance of key factors that would 
lead to the correct decision. Try to rely on your instincts and your "gut feelings" 
when making your decision.” 
 
Participants who were assigned to reject their intuitions and gut feelings received a different 
instruction set: 
“Past research has demonstrated that these types of judgments are most 
objectively accurate when the evaluator thinks about the decision in-depth. Past 
research has demonstrated that these types of judgments are most objectively 
accurate when the evaluator thinks about the decision in-depth. Try to ignore your 
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"gut feelings" as they arise and to only rely on reasons that are well-thought out 
when making your decision.”  
 
Student race manipulation. After receiving these instructions, participants were 
instructed to open the manila folders in front of them to examine the behavioral report of the 
child. This prompt also reminded participants of the instructions to either trust their intuitive 
thoughts or to reject their “gut feelings” when considering the information provided, depending  
on condition. Participants were randomly assigned to either read a behavioral report for a student 
that was named either Tyrone or Eric. This manipulation was used to prime stereotypes related to 
African-Americans or not, respectively (Wheeler et al., 2001). The behavioral reports were 
identical with the exception of the student’s name. The report described several observations of 
potential behavioral problems as noted by that student’s teacher, and these behaviors were 
designed to be ambiguously aggressive. For example, one item stated, “Tyrone (Eric) hit another 
student with a wadded up piece of paper, but he claimed it was an accident and that he was 
aiming for the trash can.” (See Appendix A for a full list of these behaviors). In order to control 
for differences in time, participants were allotted two minutes to examine the report in the manila 
folder before the screen prompted them to continue with the experiment. 
 Measures. Next, participants provided their responses on various ratings of the child 
described in the report, including their attitudes toward the student, and their perceptions of the 
student’s intelligence and aggressiveness on 7-point semantic differentials. The participants 
indicated their attitudes toward the student on two 7-point semantic differentials (e.g., 1 = not at 
all likable, 7 = very much likable). These two measures were highly related (α = .73), so I 
averaged them to form a composite index of participants' attitudes towards the student. Then, 
participants gave their recommendation concerning whether or not the student should be placed 
in the program on a dichotomous choice measure, indicating either, “Yes, this student should be 
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enrolled in this program,” or, “No, this student should not be enrolled in this program.” 
Following their choice, participants rated their levels of certainty on two 7-point semantic 
differentials (e.g., 1 = not at all certain, 7 = very much certain) and these two measures were  
highly related (α = .85), so they were averaged into a composite index of participants’ certainty. 
Finally, participants rated their ambivalence about their judgment on two 7-point semantic 
differentials (e.g., 1=”I feel not at all mixed about my decision,” 7=”I feel extremely mixed 
about my decision”) which were also highly related (α = .73), and so I averaged them into a 
composite rating of participants’ ambivalence.  
Participants also completed two items to check for the effectiveness of the manipulations 
and to verify that they had followed instructions and correctly perceived the intended race of the 
student. Participants responded to a question about the extent to which they used their gut 
feelings to make their decision on a 7-point semantic differential scale (e.g., 1=”Not at all” 
7=”To a great extent”). They were also given a free-response question about what race they 
perceived the child as being.   
 After completing the first portion of the experiment, participants were told they would 
take a questionnaire as part of a different study on the personality and attitudes of students. The 
questionnaire presented 20 items, in random order from the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC; 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), the Internal and External Motivations to Control for Prejudiced 
Responses Scales (Plant & Devine, 1998), and the Faith in Intuition Scale (FI; Epstein et al., 
1996; see Appendix B for the complete list of these items). The NFC and FI scales were assessed 
at the same time as the internal and external motivation items so as to minimize participants’ 
suspicions about the true purpose of collecting their responses to these items.  Upon completion 
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of this section, participants were thanked for their participation and were fully debriefed on the 
true purposes of the experiment.   
 
Results 
Manipulation checks. I tested to see whether the effects of the manipulations were 
successful in influencing whether participants “correctly” identified the race of the student based 
on the name of the student provided in the report, as well as whether participants used or rejected 
their intuitions and “gut feelings.” 5 participants failed to provide the correct name of the 
student, and so they were excluded from further analyses. Among the remaining participants, 21 
participants failed to identify the student with the “correct” race of the child, and so these 
participants were also excluded from primary analyses.  
Furthermore, when participants were repeated instructed to “use their intuitions” (versus 
“reject their intuitions”), I expected that they would report using their gut feelings more on the 
manipulation check measure. Entering this 2-cell manipulation (instruction set: use intuition 
versus reject intuition) into a one-way ANOVA revealed a null effect of instruction set, F(1, 
155)=0.05, p=.819. Participants who were instructed to “use their intuition” used their gut to a 
relatively high degree (M=5.5), but participants who were instead instructed to “reject their 
intuition” did not significantly differ in the extent to which they reported using their gut feelings 
(M=5.5). In examining the distribution of participants’ responses to this 7-point measure, I found 
that those instructed to use their intuitions reported using their gut feelings at a minimum of 3 
and a maximum of 7, the high endpoint of the scale. In contrast, participants that were instructed 
to reject their intuitions reported using their gut feelings across the entire range of values, 
including the top two maximum scores on this measure. This indicated that many participants 
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used their gut to a large degree, even when explicitly instructed not to do so. Thus, based on the 
distribution of scores from those participants who were instructed to “go with their gut,” I 
excluded 47 participants in the “reject your gut” condition who provided a response at the top 
two points of the instructional manipulation check measure. When entering both student race and 
instruction set as predictors of the gut feelings manipulation check measure, there was only a 
main effect of instruction set, F(1,108)=23.92, p<.001, indicating that this exclusion rule 
successfully isolated participants who followed experimental instructions. In all, the exclusion 
criteria based on these manipulation checks removed 73 participants from the initial sample, 
leaving a total of 110 participants for primary analyses.  
Attitudes toward the student. Attitudes toward the student were submitted to a 2 
[instruction set: use intuition versus reject intuition] X 2 [student name: Eric versus Tyrone] 
between-participants ANOVA. There was no significant effect of the name of the student on 
participants’ attitudes toward the student, F(1,105)=0.32, p=.727, ηp
2
=.006, nor was there a 
significant effect of the instruction set on participants’ attitudes toward the student, 
F(1,105)=0.43, p=.515,  ηp
2
=.004. The interaction between the two independent variables was 
also not significant, but was trending towards significance such that participants instructed to use 
their gut feelings liked Tyrone more (M=3.68) than when instructed to reject their gut feelings 
(M=3.31), but participants instructed to use their gut feelings liked Eric less (M=3.56) than when 
instructed to reject their gut feelings (M=3.76), F(1,105)=2.56, p=.112  
Judgment to recommend student to disciplinary program. Participants’ dichotomous 
choice of recommending or not recommending that the student be placed into a behavioral 
program was also submitted to a 2 X 2 ANOVA. There was no significant effect of the thinking 
style manipulation, F(1,105)=0.64, p=.424, ηp
2 
=.006, and the name of the student also did not 
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have a significant effect, F(1,105)=1.16, p=.319, ηp
2 
=.022. The interaction between this two 
variables also produced no significant effect, F(1,105)=0.30, p=.583, ηp
2 
=.003. 
Judgmental certainty, ambivalence, and discomfort. Despite the null findings, I was 
interested in seeing if the manipulations were effective in predicting changes in participants’ 
reported certainty, ambivalence, and general feelings of discomfort after making a decision about 
the student. Thus, these three measures were also submitted to 2 X 2 between-participants 
ANOVAs, with instruction set and student race entered as factors. The results revealed a main 
effect of instruction set on certainty, F(1,105)=10.89, p<.001, ηp
2 
=.094. Participants instructed to 
reject their gut feelings were significantly less certain in their judgments (M=4.14) compared to 
those who were instructed to rely on their gut feelings (M=5.01). There was also a significant 
main effect of the thinking style manipulation on participants’ ambivalence, F(1,105)=4.11, 
p<.05, ηp
2 
=.038. Participants instructed to rely on their gut feelings (M=3.31) were significantly 
less ambivalent than participants instructed to reject their gut feelings (M=3.85). 
Motivation to Respond without Prejudice. I was also interested to see if the manipulations 
affected participants’ motivation to respond without prejudice. A 2 X 2 between-participants 
ANOVA by condition revealed a significant main effect of the name of the student on 
participants’ self-reported external motivation to respond without prejudice, F(1,105)=3.72, 
p<.05, ηp
2 
=.066. Participants who received information regarding a student named Tyrone 
(M=5.39) reported significant greater external motivation to respond without prejudice than 
participants who received information regarding a student named Eric (M=4.88). Furthermore, 
the interaction between thinking style condition and the name of the student was significant, 
F(1,105)=5.40, p<.05, ηp
2 
=.049. When participants read about a student named Tyrone, they 
expressed greater externally-focused motivations to respond without prejudice in their responses 
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when they were instructed to reject their gut feelings (M=5.98) relative to those who were told to 
rely on their gut feelings(M=5.18). Conversely, when participants learned about Eric, they 
expressed significantly less external motivation to respond without prejudice when instructed to 
reject their gut feelings (M=4.27) relative to those who were told to rely on their gut feelings 
(M=5.19). 
Correlational analyses. Given that the manipulations failed to yield significant effects on 
several of the dependent measures, I conducted correlational analyses among the variables of 
interest to determine if any of the predicted patterns would emerge (see Table 1). In the present 
study, participants who perceived the student as aggressive were significantly more likely to 
recommend that student for placement in the behavioral program, r = .254, p < .01. Participants 
who decided to recommend either student for placement in the behavioral program were 
significantly more likely to report feeling conflicted about their decision, r = .202, p < .05.  
When analyzing the individual difference measures, it was found that those higher in FI 
were significantly more likely to report feeling more certain in their judgment, r = .241, p < .05. 
There were also significantly less likely to report feeling conflicted about their judgments, r = -
.194, p <.05. Furthermore, participants higher in FI were less likely to recommend either student 
for placement in the behavioral program, r = -.197, p < .05. Participants high in NFC were 
significantly more likely to report having high internal motivation to control for prejudice, r = 
.190, p < .05.  
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Table 1 
 
Correlations Between Measures 
 GutGood TyroneY contrast External Internal yjudg attitude certain ambiv 
GutGood Pearson Correlation 1 .086 -.121 .096 .056 -.070 .081 .310
**
 -.193
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .362 .199 .305 .556 .457 .389 .001 .039 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
TyroneY Pearson Correlation .086 1 .380
**
 .179 .143 -.048 -.048 -.115 .106 
Sig. (2-tailed) .362  .000 .055 .126 .609 .610 .221 .259 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
contrast Pearson Correlation -.121 .380
**
 1 -.142 .057 -.029 .051 -.022 .020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .199 .000  .130 .546 .755 .587 .815 .831 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
External Pearson Correlation .096 .179 -.142 1 .104 .100 -.169 -.047 .127 
Sig. (2-tailed) .305 .055 .130  .267 .288 .071 .615 .176 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Internal Pearson Correlation .056 .143 .057 .104 1 -.007 .085 .066 .088 
Sig. (2-tailed) .556 .126 .546 .267  .938 .369 .485 .350 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
yjudg Pearson Correlation -.070 -.048 -.029 .100 -.007 1 -.342
**
 -.160 .206
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .457 .609 .755 .288 .938  .000 .088 .027 
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N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
attitude Pearson Correlation .081 -.048 .051 -.169 .085 -.342
**
 1 .261
**
 -.208
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .389 .610 .587 .071 .369 .000  .005 .026 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
certain Pearson Correlation .310
**
 -.115 -.022 -.047 .066 -.160 .261
**
 1 -.621
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .221 .815 .615 .485 .088 .005  .000 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
ambiv Pearson Correlation -.193
*
 .106 .020 .127 .088 .206
*
 -.208
*
 -.621
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .259 .831 .176 .350 .027 .026 .000  
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
**NOTE: contrast = GutGood * TyroneY 
 
Discussion 
 I hypothesized that participants instructed to rely more on their intuitions and gut feelings 
as they evaluated an ambiguously aggressive student would be more likely to make stereotypical 
and prejudicial judgments when this student was perceived to be African-American, compared to 
participants instructed to reject their “gut feelings” and when the student was perceived to be 
White. Analysis of the results indicated that participants did not differ in their attitudes toward 
the student across any of the conditions. Participants who received an instruction set to rely on 
their “gut feelings” to make their judgments were also no more likely to recommend a student 
named Tyrone for placement in a behavioral program than a student named Eric; furthermore, 
participants who were given a student named Tyrone to evaluate, rather than a student named 
Eric, were not significantly more likely overall to recommend the student for placement in a 
disciplinary behavioral program. Thus, the primary hypotheses were not confirmed.  
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There are several possible reasons why this experiment may not have yielded the 
predicted pattern results. Perhaps a manipulating the perceived race of the student by using 
names of a student was too salient to produce the intended effects. Also, perhaps the number of 
ambiguously aggressive behaviors included in the student report built too effective of a case that 
this student’s need to be placed in a behavioral program was difficult to determine. A situation 
involving less evidence to consider might have prompted participants to rely more on a heuristic 
thinking style when directed to do so. Also, analysis of the extent to which participants reported 
using their gut feelings showed that those participants directed to not use their “gut feelings” 
actually reported relying on their “gut feelings” to a large extent. This might suggest that some 
people have difficulty rejecting their “gut feelings” if they tend to rely on their intuitions when 
the information is ambiguous. In a future study, a control condition that makes no 
recommendation of how to think about the available evidence could be added to further evaluate 
the effectiveness of this manipulation. 
Although the initial hypotheses were not confirmed, some of the results obtained were 
consistent with what could be predicted from the existing literature on stereotyping and 
judgments. I hypothesized that the when people perceived the student as more aggressive, people 
would be more likely to recommend that the student be placed in the disciplinary program, and 
the correlation analyses confirmed this prediction. Thus, the conceptual relationship between 
these two variables seems to be sound. Additionally, the interaction of the manipulations 
successfully prompted participants to report possessing relatively more extreme external, but not 
internal, motivations to respond without prejudice, such that participants who were instructed to 
reject their intuitions and gut reactions scored much higher when the student was named Tyrone 
versus when he was named Eric. In other words, by trying to alleviate participants’ social 
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judgeability concerns by encouraging them to rely on their intuitions and gut feelings, the 
manipulations might have ironically increased their social judgeability concerns, causing 
participants to claim that their thinking style was consistent with what was requested. An 
alternative explanation for the null results on the dependent measures of interest, then, might be 
that participants were motivated to hide any detectable signs that prejudicial beliefs may have 
influenced their attitudes toward, and judgments of, a presumably African-American student. 
Future work could possibly use more subtle manipulations of student race, perhaps by giving the 
student a race-neutral name (e.g., Terry, D.J.) and subsequently pairing this name with 
subliminal primes related to African-American or White categories. Giving participants an IAT 
either prior to or after the experiment might also determine whether judgments made about the 
student depend on implicit attitudes associating African-American with aggression, and whether 
participants’ judgments are impacted by these implicit attitudes depending on whether they were 
instructed to rely on or reject these relatively more automatic associations. 
Interestingly, participants instructed to rely on their gut feelings to make their decision 
were more likely to report feeling more confident and less conflicted about their decision 
compared to participants rejecting their intuitions, regardless of their actual judgments of the 
student. This suggests that instructing participants to trust more in their intuitions may 
temporarily alter their liking of their intuitions in such a way that they behave similarly to 
someone who reports high chronic Faith in Intuition (Epstein et al., 1996). Perhaps a byproduct 
of using an intuitive thinking process is that those who believe it is the best method to arrive at a 
judgment also end up having higher certainty in their judgments.  
It is also entirely plausible that individual differences in Need for Cognition (NFC; 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)  and FI (Epstein et al., 1996) may reflect individuals’ preferences 
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to process information at two extreme of a processing continuum, which may in turn predict 
consequentially different patterns of results in the current study. When it comes to stereotyping, 
research has shown that individuals high versus low in NFC are both affected by stereotypes 
when making judgments, but in different ways. Crawford and Skowronski (1998) found that 
individuals low in NFC were more likely to directly use stereotypes as a basis for judging a 
Hispanic defendant as guilty, whereas those high in NFC were more likely to base their decision 
on thoughtful consideration of the information given. However, individuals high in NFC were 
still susceptible to the effects of stereotyping in that they demonstrated a memory bias for 
remembering more information that would suggest guilt when the defendant was Hispanic rather 
than Caucasian. 
There are potentially interesting implications for NFC and FI to separately or 
interactively moderate the results of the current study, and future research would benefit from an 
examination of these individual differences on their effects on people when forming evaluations 
using relatively more automatically-activated, “intuitive” information, and how these two 
individual differences might predict expressed external and internal motivations to respond 
without prejudice when race is a salient social feature of the situation. 
More research is needed studying the relationship between individuals’ tendency to use 
their intuitions and their judgmental certainty. It appears from this study that relying more on 
intuitions and gut feelings leads people to feel more certain and less conflicted in their 
evaluations, even when the information they are processing is vague or ambiguous. Possible 
future directions might involve determining whether this effect is robust and holds up under 
other types of manipulation or what the possible mechanisms driving this effect might be.  
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Appendix A 
 Student report form given to participants 
BEHAVIOR OBSERVERED DURING EVALUATION PERIOD: 
 
01/16/12  Tyrone/Eric hit another child with a wadded up piece of paper, but he claimed it was 
an accident and that he was aiming for the trash can.  
01/19/12  Tyrone/Eric had to be disciplined for poking another student with his eraser until the 
child got annoyed today. 
01/25/12  Another student claimed that Tyrone/Eric was annoying him while the group was out 
in the hallway working on a project. He said that Tyrone kept trying to distract him from getting 
the work done. This is a student Tyrone/Eric has had some problems with before. 
02/20/12  Tyrone/Eric took a pencil off of another child’s desk without asking, and he returned it 
quickly when asked to do so. 
02/27/12  Tyrone/Eric bumped into another student walking down the hallway. However, it was 
unclear to me whether Tyrone/Eric was intentionally pushing the other child or not paying 
attention to where he was going.  
03/15/12  Tyrone/Eric refused to read and seemed to be in a poor mood all day. 
03/25/12  I noticed Tyrone/Eric and another child in an argument on the playground. I noticed 
Tyrone/Eric yell, “Shut up!” to the other child, then I went to intervene.  The other children who 
witnessed the incident claim that they do not know who started the argument. 
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OTHER COMMENTS: 
Tyrone/Eric appears to be a bright student at times, but is very quiet and sometimes moody. 
Seems capable of doing well, but struggles with a few subjects. It appears he gets along with a 
few of his peers, but sometimes keeps to himself and gets into arguments with other students.  
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Appendix B 
Faith in Intuition. (rated from 1-5, 1=”Completely false” and 5=”Completely true”). 
I trust my initial feelings about people. 
I believe in trusting my hunches. 
My initial impressions of people are almost always right. 
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut feelings." 
I can usually feel whether a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I know. 
External Motivation to Respond without Prejudice. (rated from 1-9, 1=”Strongly disagree and 
9=”Strongly agree”). 
Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards, I try to appear non-prejudiced towards 
Black people. 
I try to hide any negative thoughts towards Black people in order to avoid negative reactions 
from others. 
If I acted prejudiced towards Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry 
with me. 
I attempt to appear non-prejudiced towards Black people in order to avoid disapproval from 
others. 
I try to act non-prejudiced towards Black people because of pressure from others. 
Internal Motivation to Respond without Prejudice (rated from 1-9, 1=”Strongly disagree and 
9=”Strongly agree”) 
I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important 
for me. 
According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK. 
I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be non-prejudiced toward Black people. 
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Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong. 
Being non-prejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept. 
Need for Cognition (rated from 1-5, 1=”Completely false” and 5=”Completely true”). 
I prefer complex to simple problems. 
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
 
